Washington Law Review
Volume 6

Number 2

5-1-1931

Recent Cases
H. S.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
H. S., Recent Cases, Recent Cases, 6 Wash. L. Rev. 88 (1931).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol6/iss2/4

This Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-EXTENSION OF TIME-CONSIDERATION.
Plaintiff agreed to
sell a farm to defendant who assumed a mortgage of $3,000.00; made a
small payment down and agreed to pay the balance with interest at 6%,
$1,000.00 on Aug. 12, 1928, $3,000.00 on Aug. 12, 1929, and $250.00 semiannually until balance was paid.
Defendant delivered her note for $3,000.00 with interest payable
monthly to cover payment due 1929, the whole to be payable at option
of plaintiff in case of default in interest payments. Defendant became
in default. Plaintiff demanded payment of all due on contract and the
whole note plus interest. Defendant alleged that at that time an agreement was entered into orally that defendant should have 30 days in which
to pay the amount due on the contract. Plaintiff sued within two days.
Held: Instructions to the effect that unless the defendant expressly
agreed to pay interest for the agreed 30-day period, such agreement was
without consideration, were erroneous.
The agreement to pay the contract rate of interest for the extended
period is implied in law and is sufficient consideration to support the
agreement of extension. Stankey et al. v. Godwin, 58 Wash. Dec. 331, 291
Pac. 725 (1930)
That the rate of interest of the original contract or note is an implied
term of the agreement to extend in the absence of an express promise,
admits of little discussion. Nelson v. Flagg, 18 Wash. 39, 50 Pac. 571
(1897)
See also Commercial Bank of Tacoma v. Hart, 10 Wash. 303, 38
Pac. 1114 (1894)
The more perplexing question is whether the implied agreement to
pay this interest is sufficient consideration. The case of Nelson v. Flagg,
supra, treated the question as one previously undetermined by this court,
seemingly ignoring or not cognizant of Stickler v. Giles in which the court
said that an agreement to pay interest on an account which would not
otherwise draw interest is founded on consideration, but such an agreement would constitute no consideration if, without it, the account would
draw the same rate of interest. Stickler v. Giles, 9 Wash. 147, 37 Pac. 293
(1894)
The language was but dictum, however, for the extension lacked
the necessary element of being for a definite time. Neither was any
authority cited to support the statement.
An earlier case indicated the problem, deciding that a promise to forbear to sue for a definite time, when the promise is based upon a sufficient
consideration, can be pleaded in bar to the action. Stayer & Walker v.
Misstmer et al., 6 Wash. 173, 32 Pac. 995 (1893)
However, the court was
directly confronted with the problem, for there was in fact additional
security given for the extension which met the demand for consideration.
The proposition that such an extension without more than an implied
agreement to pay interest is not binding is not without support outside
of the dictum above quoted. A leading case for the proposition holds thqt
it
is essential to a valid extension of time of payment that
it involve the essentials of a binding contract. There must be a reasonably definite time agreed upon and agreed equivalent rendered for the
extension, and that agreed equivalent must be a real considerationsomething more than the payee would be entitled to in case of mere
indulgence of the payor by allowing the debt to run "past due." Fannaig v. Murphy et al., 126 Wis. 538, 105 N. W 1056, 5 Ann. Cas. 435, 4
L. R. A. (ns) 666 (1906). See also the cases of Harburg v. Kuanpf. 151 Mo.
16, 52 S. W 19 (1899)
Kellogg v. Olmsted, 25 N. Y. 189 (1862)
and
Olmstead v. Latimer et al., 158 N. Y. 313, 53 N. E. 5 (1899)
That the agreement to extend must be for a definite time was early
held to be essential, Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H. 240 (1842) and is now the
weight of authority 5 Ann. Cas. 435 note. The Fanning case, supra, may
be distinguished from the main case on this ground, for in the Fanning
case the agreement was in fact for no definite time.
Another Washington case, Price v. Mitchell et al., 23 Wash. 742, 63
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Pac. 514 (1901), on first blush seems to support the doctrine of the Fanning case, holding that an agreement to pay a lesser rate of interest for
the extended time is no consideration. On closer examination, however,
the case appears to be an agreement for a period from due date up to the
time of the new agreement, being thus but an agreement to pay what
was already legally due or less.
The weight of reason and authority, however, seems to be with Nclson v. Flagg, supra, which is relied on to support the main case. It would
seem that there is sufficient consideration, for the creditor forbears to
sue for a definite time in exchange for the promise of the debtor to keep
the money and pay interest thereon for this time. Without such agree,ment, it would be the privilege of the debtor to pay at any time after
maturity and thus stop the running of interest. Reed v. Tierney, 12 App.
D. C. 173 (1898) Dissent of Fanning v. Murphy, supra, Nelson 'v. Flagg,
supra, Vran de Ven et al v. Overlook Mining Co., 146 Wash. 332, 262 Pac.
981 (1928).
The problem is not simple though, for there is always the question:
Was the extension mere sufferance on the part of the creditor or was
there in fact a promise to keep the money and pay interest for the full
extended time? The question might be the basis of distinction between
the cases of the quite numerous minority and the majority, Benson v.
Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 29 S. W 1061 (1895).
Once having found such promise on the part of the debtor, the main
case is undoubtedly correct.
H. S.
NUISANCE-CEMETERY-RIGHT TO INJUNCTION. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin
the enlargement of a cemetery across the road from their homes, contending: First, that their wells will be contaminated, as the water table flows
towards them; second, salability of their land has been lessened and will
continue to be lessened; third, the use of the cemetery interferes with the
comfortable enjoyment of life and property. Held: Mere presence of a
cemetery is not ground for injunctive relief, unless there is offensive or
injurious drainage or fumes; the evidence not only fails to show that
wells of the plaintiffs would be contaminated, but conclusively shows that
it would be highly improbable for them to be damaged at all; therefore,
judgment for the defendants is affirmed. Hite v. Cashmere Cemetery Association, 58 Wash. Dec. 267, 290 Pac. 1108 (1930).
This is in accord with American weight of authority to the effect that
a cemetery is not a nuisance per se; Kullman v. City of Beloit, 123 Kan.
645, 256 Pac. 806 (1927)
but it may become one because of its operation,
Farb v. Theis (Tex. Civ. App.), 250 S. W 290 (1923)
or location, Union
Cemetery Co. v. Harrison, 20 Ala. App. 291, 101 So. 517 (1924) although
usually pollution of the atmosphere by odors or contamination of springs
or wells from the cemetery's drainage must be shown, Rea 'v. Tacoma
Mausoleum Association, 103 Wash. 429, 174 Pac. 961, 1 A. L. R. 541 (1918).
A burial ground will not be enjoined on account of proximity Allen
v. Acacia Park Cemetery Association, 145 Wash. 571, 261 Pac. 96 (1929)
depreciation in value of land; Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest
Cemetery Co., 316 Ill. 226, 147 N. E. 104 (1925)
unpleasant reflections
suggested by being reminded constantly of death; McDaniel v. Forrest
Park Cemetery Co., 156 Ark. 571, 246 S. W 874 (1923) or because offensive to the esthetic sense of the adjoining owner of property* Sutton v.
Findlay Cemetery Association, 270 Ill. 11, 110 N. E. 315, L. R. A. 1916B
1135, Ann. Cas. 1917B 559 (1915)
because places for the disposal of the
dead are necessary and, therefore, private convenience must give way
to public convenience; Hardin v. Huckabay (facts almost identical with
the principal case), 6 La. App. 640 (1927).
However, when a person's
health is endangered from pollution of air or water, the courts do not
consider the convenience of the public in reading a decision. Symmonds
v. Novelty Cemetery Association (Mo. App.) 21 S. W (2d) 889 (1929).
Just as the continuance of a cemetery as a nuisance may be adjudged,
so may the establishment of one. But it must be proved that the in-
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juries will be probable; Braasch v. Cemetery Association of the Evangelical Lutheran Christ Society, 69 Neb. 300, 95 N. W 646, 5 Ann. Cas. 132
(1903)
and substantial, Nelson v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Cemetery Association, 111 Minn. 149, 126 N. W 723, 127 N. W 626, 34 L. R. A.
(n.s.) 565, 20 Ann. Cas. 290 (1910)
and not merely speculative; Payne
v. Town of Wayland, 183 Ia. 659, 109 N. W 203 (1906)
When the public health or convenience is damaged, as from a graveyard
being in a thickly settled residential district, the cemetery is subject to
regulation by the local authorities; Menss v. Walker 160 Tenn. 468, 26
S. W (2d) 132 (1930)
and may be enjoined entirely- Board of Health
of Buncombe County v. Lewis, 196 N. C. 641, 146 S. E. 592 (1929)
On
the other hand, even the public authorities may not regulate or destroy a
burial ground without reasonable cause. Wygant v. McLaughlan, 39 Or.
429, 64 Pac. 867, 54 L. R. A. 636, 87 Am. St. Rep. 673 (1901)
The law of nuisance touching cemeteries might be deemed to be a
nice "balancing of the equities" among the cemetery owner, the private individual, and the public, with, perhaps, the last receiving the most consideration.
A. D.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-INTERNAL REvENUE-INcoME TAX RETURNS. Seaborn and wife earned during the year 1927 an income, admittedly community amounting to $38,448.17. Each spouse made a separate return, setting
forth as their respective incomes one-half of the full community income
for the year. The tax liability of plaintiff Seaborn upon the income so
reported by him was the sum of $152.38, and his wife's tax liability was
$168.32, which they duly paid to the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue. The latter determined that all of the income should have been
reported in the husband's return, and made an additional assessment
against him in the sum of $720.93, which plaintiff paid under protest; and
thereafter, upon the rejection of his claim for a refund, instituted this
suit. The statutes involved are Sec. 210(a) and 211(a) of the Revenue
Act of 1926, providing, "
there shall be levied, collected, and paid for
each taxable year upon the net income of every individual
"
By the
wording of the act, it appeared that the word "individual" referred to a
human being, and inasmuch as the word "of" denotes ownership, the question turned on what was the law of Washington as to the ownership of
community property and community income. Held: Judgment for plaintiff affirmed, the District Court being right in holding that the husband
and wife were entitled to file separate returns, each treating one-half of the
community income as their respective incomes. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S.
101, 75 L. Ed. 27, 51 Sup. Ct. 58 (1930).
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court, regarding this same
question as to taxation of community incomes in Texas, Louisiana, and
Arizona, three other community property states, are to the same effect.
Hopkins v. Bacon (Texas), 282 U. S. 122, 75 L. Ed. 34, 51 Sup. Ct. 62 (1930)
Bender v. Pfaff (Louisiana) 282 U. S. 127, 75 L. Ed. 35, 51 Sup. Ct. 64
(1930) Goodell v. Koch (Arizona) 282 U. S. 118, 75 L. Ed. 32, 51 Sup. Ct.
62 (1930)
For an exhaustive discussion of departmental and legislative history in
connection with the filing of separate returns by husbands and wives in
community property states, see an article by Judge George Donworth in 4
Wash. L. R. 145.
It is a fundamental holding of the United States Supreme Court that,
as a matter of settled policy it will follow the state decisions interpreting
state laws governing property and property rights; and that the whole
subject of domestic relations of husband and wife belongs to the laws of
the states and not to the laws of the United States. Warburton v. White,
176 U. S. 484, 44 L. Ed. 55, 20 Sup. Ct. 404 (1898)
Buscher v. Buscher
231 U. S. 157, 58 L. Ed. 166, 34 Sup. Ct. 46 (1913) DeVaughan v. Hutchnson, 165 U. S. 566, 41 L. Ed. 827, 17 Sup. Ct. 461 (1897)
See also Curry v.
Wilson, 57 Wash. 509, 107 Pac. 367 (1910).
In U. S. v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315, 70 L. Ed. 183, 46 Sup. Ct. 148 (1926),
it was held that under the community property law of California, where the
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"expectant heir," rather than the "vested right' theory prevailed up to
1927, the husband was liable for the whole tax, since the wife had but a
mere expectancy, the husband's interest being proprietory in its nature
and falling little short of absolute ownership. The husband had the
entire present proprietory interest, and that of the wife was a right in
the nature of an expectancy, held in abeyance until dissolution of the
community- during his lifetime, the husband, notwithstanding the statutory limitation upon his power of disposition, was the owner of the community property. Spreckles v. Spreckles, 172 Cal. 775, 158 Pac. 537 (1916)
Dargte v. Patterson,176 Cal. 714, 169 Pac. 360 (1917). The Robbzns decision
is therefore no authority on the question involved in the principal case,
since in Washington and in the other six community property states,
the husband and wife, both, have vested interests in the community property, though the quality of their titles may vary in the respective states.
It should be noted that by an amendment of the Civil Code of California,
effective July 29, 1927, California adopted the "vested right" theory of
community property, and while this new act has no retroactive effect
the husband and
Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546, 269 Pac. 439 (1928)
wife may hereafter report in original separate returns one-half of salaries, wages, fees earned by either after July 29, 1927, and income received from community property acquired after said date. Cumulative
Bulletin VIII-9-4122; I. T. 2457.
In view of the well established holding in Washington that the community property system of this state vests equally in husband and wife,
the ownership and enjoyment of all community property, it is submitted
that the decision in the instant case is a correct interpretation of the
Income Tax Act.
-P.
R. G.
EQUITY-LAcHES-STATUTES OF LIMITATION. Plaintiff seeks to set aside
as fraudulent a transfer of stock in a hotel corporation made by his
judgment debtor to her son and son-in-law. The transfer was made in
1924, at which time the corporation was heavily incumbered, the transferees having formed an operating company and taken over the operation
of the two hotels in an attempt to recoup the losses of the corporation.
Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendant in 1929 on notes
issued by defendant and her deceased husband, which he as indorser had
been forced to pay shortly after the death of the husband in 1924. The
evidence tended to prove that plaintiff was a relative of defendant's, had
been frequently consulted about the affairs of the corporation, knew of
the attempt to save the corporation, and of the transfer of the stock.
Held: Plaintiff has stood by, with full knowledge of his rights and permitted the transferees to carry the burden of the corporation for five or
six years in an attempt to give some value of its stock, and can get no
relief because of his laches. Carstens v. Morec, 59 Wash. Dec. 17, 292
Pac. 262 (1930).
Laches is a negative equitable doctrine which finds its origin in the
maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their
rights, and rests upon consideration of public policy. Crodle v. Dodge, 99
Wash. 121, 168 Pac. 986 (1917) Castnerv. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171, 25 A. R. 369
(1876). Although it has always been held that its operation is akin to
estoppel, Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) Vol 4, page 3418, a
number of modern courts hold the doctrine is grounded on equitable
estoppel, Young v. Jones, 72 Wash. 227, 130 Pac. 90 (1913) Bowe 'v. Provmdent Loan Corporation,120 Wash. 574, 208 Pac. 22 (1922) State v. Plummer 130 Wash. 135, 226 Pac. 273 (1924) Elder v. Western Mining Co.,
150 C. C. A. 616, 237 Fed. 966 (1916) Powell v. Bowen, 279 Mo. 280, 214
S. W 142 (1919)
State V. McPhail, 156 Tenn. 459, 2 S. W (2d) 413
(1928).
Mere lapse of time is insufficient to bring the doctrine into
activity, Gay v. Havermale, 27 Wash. 390, 67 Pac. 804 (1902)
Eno .v.
Sanders, 39 Wash. 238, 81 Pac. 696 (1905)
Neppach v. Jones, 20 Ore. 491,
26 Pac. 569, 23 A. S. R. 145 (1891) Galliher v. Caldwell, 145 U. S. 368, 12
Sup. Ct. 873, 36 L. Ed. 738 (1891) ,McWilliams v. Excelsior Coal Co., 298
Fed. 884 (1924) United States v. Work, 13 Fed (2d) 302 (1926) Mary-

92

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

land Casualty Co. v. Dickerson, 213 Ky 305, 280 S. W 1106 t1926). Complainant must know of the existence of his rights, Blake v. Merritt, 101
Wash. 57, 171 Pac. 1013 (1918) Raymond v. Hattrick, 104 Wash. 619, 1"7
Ackerson v. Elliott, 97 Wash. 31, 165 Pac. 889 (1917)
Pac. 640 (1919)
Burn-ngham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 Pac. 977 (1926) and there must
be some change of position or relations of the parties adverse to the
party sought to be charged which would make it inequitable to enforce
Sulthe claim, Brun v. Mann, 151 Fed. 145, 12 L. R. A. (NS) 154 (1906)
livan v. Portland and Kennebec Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806 (1876) Stevenson v. Boyd, 153 Cal. 630, 96 Pac. 284, 19 L. R. A. (NS) 525 (1908) Mace
v. Ship Pond Land & Lbr Co., 112 Me. 420, 92 Atl. 486 (1914) Bergman
Lindblom v. Johnson, 92
v. Evans, 92 Wash. 158, 158 Pac. 961 (1916)
Conner v. Hodgdon, 120 Wash. 426, 207
Wash. 171, 158 Pac. 972 (1916)
Ordinarily the length of time is immaterial if the other
Pac. 675 (1922)
factors are present, Kellner v. Rowe, 137 Wash. 418, 242 Pac. 353 (1926).
Where the obligation is clear, and its essential character has not been
changed by lapse of time, equity enforces a claim of long standing as
readily as one of recent origin, as between the immediate parties to the
transaction. If the defendant has not been misled by the delay to his
injury or in any way placed in worse position by complainant's tardiness,
there is no laches, Schultz v. O'Hearn, 319 Ill. 244, 149 N. E. 808 (1925).
It has sometimes been held that mere lapse of time may constitute a
waiver of complainant's rights, unless otherwise explained, Wvhite V.
Bailey, 65 Va. 573, 64 S. E. 1019, 23 L. R. A. (NS) 232 (1909) Depiie v.
Blake v.
Miller 65 W Va. 120, 64 S. E. 740, 23 L. R. A. (NS) 775 (1909)
Merritt, supra. As to the application of the doctrine of lacies to cases
where rescission of contracts is sought on the basis of fraud, see 2 WAsH.
L. R. 132.
An important problem arises as to the relation between the application of the doctrine of laches in courts of equity and the application
of statutes of limitation in the law courts, especially in the states where
law and equity are administered in the same court. Two distinct lines
of decisions appear in the state courts; those enforcing the statute, and
those refusing to do so. In the first group the tendency is to hold that
the statute of limitations in general applies equally in equity as in law
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 238 Mass. 403, 131 N. E. 177 (1921) Bottrell v. FarmLawrence v.
ers' Bank &-Trust Co., 172 Ark. 1165, 291 S. W 832 (1927)
Melvn, 202 Iowa 866, 211 N. W 410 (1927) Brown v. Harrison, 242 Mich.
Eves v. Roberts, 96 Wash. 99, 164 Pac. 915
603, 219 N. W 606 (1928)
Retner v. Clarke County, 137 Wash. 194, 241 Pac. 973 (1926)
(1917)
State v. Plummer supra. Compare Hotchkin v. McNaught-Collins Improvement Co., 102 Wash. 161, 172 Pac. 864 (1918) while a few have held that
in cases where law and equity are administered by the same courts, they
are bound by the statute of limitations, rather in obedience to it than on
the analogy that equity follows the law Minion v. Warner 238 N. Y. 413,
144 N. E. 655, 41 A. L. R. 1412 (1924) Wentworth v. Wentworth, 75 N. H.
see Hotchkin v. McNaught-Collins Improvement
547, 78 Atl. 646 (1910)
Co., supra. In the second group the general statement is usually made
that the period of delay may be longer or shorter than the statute of limiWalker
tations. Rodgers v. Beckel, 172 Mich. 544, 138 N. W 202 (1912)
Mace v. Shtp Pond Land &
v. Jackson, 48 Idaho 18, 279 Pac. 293 (1929)
Lbr Co., supra, while a few states hold that a statute of limitations does
not strictly apply in equity suits. United States v. Fletcher Savings &
Trust Co., 197 Ind. 527, 151 N. E. 420 (1926) Mays v. Morrell, 65 Or. 558,
Duncan v. Dazy, 318 Ill. 500, 149 N. E. 495 (1925)
132 Pac. 714 (1913)
Jersey City v. Jersey City Water Supply Co., 90 N. J. Eq. 14, 105 Atl. 494
(1918) unless otherwise provided by law Virgzza C. Mining. Milling &f
The federal
Smelting Co. v. Clayton, 233 S. W 215 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1921)
decisions are in harmony with this view being reluctant to follow state
statutes in applying the doctrine of laches, and if they do so, it is by
Kansas City
analogy only Mason v. MacFadden, 298 Fed. 384 (1924)
City of Seattle v.
Southern Railway Co. v. May, 2 Fed (2d) 680 (1924)
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Puget Sound Power & LAght Co., 15 Fed. (2d) 794 (1927) Bell v. John H.
Giles Dyeing Machine Co., 37 Fed. (2d) 483 (1930).
It seems well settled, however, that relief may be refused even though
the delay or lapse of time is less than the statutory period governing
such cases at law. Kellner v. Rowe, sapra, Stevenson v. Boyd, supra,
Wooding v. Puget Sound National Bank, 11 Wash. 527, 40 Pac. 223 (1895)
Warfield v. Anglo &
Nickel v. Janda, 115 Okl. 207, 242 Pac. 264 (1926)
Dry v. Rice,
London Paris Nat. Bank, 202 Cal. 345, 260 Pac. 881 (1927)
147 Va. 331, 137 S. E. 473 (1928) State v. Abernathy, 159 Tenn. 175, 17
Smith v. Smith, 291 Pac. 298 (Utah 1930). AlS. W (2d) 17 (1929)
though laches resembles statutory limitation, it differs in important particulars. Limitation is concerned with the fact of delay* laches with its
effect. Laches is negligence or omission seasonably to assert a right. It
exists when the omission to assert the right has continued for an unreasonable and unexplained lapse of time, and under circumstances where
the delay has been prejudicial to the adverse party, and when it would
be inequitable to enforce the right. Duryea v. Elkhorn Coal & Coke Corporation, 123 Me. 482, 124 Atl. 206 (1924).
In the instant case, plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statute
of limitations, and had not the evidence disclosed sufficient facts to support a finding of laches, the same result would -in all probability have
been reached on the authority of Eves v. Roberts, State v. Plummer
Reiner v. Clarke County and Hotchkin v. McNaught-Collins i-)-ronent
S. D. H.
Co., supra.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-PRIZE FIGHTiNG-AcTioNs

DEFENSES-CONSENT OF PARTIES.

For

WRoNGFuL DEATH

The administrator of the estate of Cart-

wright brought suit to recover damages for the death of Cartwright under
Rem. Comp. Stat., 183, for the benefit of the dependant surviving spouse.
Death resulted from injuries received while Cartwright was engaged in a
prize fight with the defendant Geysel. The prize fight was unlawful under
Rem. Comp. Stat., 2256. Held: That under the facts of the case, consent
to the assault and battery constituted a good defense to plaintiff's action.
Holcomb and Fullerton, J. J., dissenting. Hart as Administrator v. Geysel
et al., 59 Wash. Dec. 461, 294 Pac. 570 (1930)
There are two rules in the United States: the numerical majority rule
which is that consent is not a bar to recovery in an action for assault and
battery, and the minority rule which is that consent is a bar to recovery.
Supporting the majority rule are the following cases: Wiley v. Carpenter,
64 Vt. 212, 23 Atl. 630, 15 L. R. A. 853 (1892) Adams v. Waggoner 33 Ind.
Barholt v. Wright, 45 Ohio St. 177, 12 N. E.
531, 5 A. S. R. 230 (1870)
185, 4 A. S. R. 535 (1887) McNeil v. Mullins, 70 Kan. 634, 79 Pac. 168
(1905) Morris v. Miller, 83 Neb. 218, 119 N. W 131, A. S. R. 636, 20 L. R. A.
Colby v,. McLenden, 85 Okl. 293, 206 Pac. 207, 30 A. L. R.
(ns) 907 (1909)
196 (1922) Royer v. Belcher 100 W Va. 694, 131 S. E. 556 (1922) Shay v.
Thompson, 59 Wis. 540, 18 N. W 473 (1884) Lund v,. Taylor 115 Iowa 236,
Teolis v. Mos88 N. W 458 (1901) Jones v. Gale, 22 Mo. App. 637 (1886)
catelli, 44 R. I. 494, 119 Atl. 161 (1923). The minority rule is supported
by the following authorities: White v. Whittall, 113 Mich. 493, 71 N. W
1118 (1897) Lykns v. Hamrtck, 144 Ky. 80, 137 S. W 852 (1911) Wright
v,. Starr 42 Nev. 441, 179 Pac. 877 (1919).
Recovery may be had if the injury results from excessive or unnecessary
force under both the majority and minority rules. Colby 'v. McClendon,
This
supra, Gailbraith v,. Fleming, 60 Mich. 403, 27 N. W 581 (1884)
explains the case of Milam v,. Milam, 46 Wash. 468, 90 Pac. 595 (1907).
Consent to be bitten cannot be inferred from engaging in a mutual fist
fight. Note that this is not a limitation upon the seriousness of the injury
as affecting the rule of liability but applies only when force is used beyond
the logical limit of the consent. See Lykins v. Hamrwk, supra, in which
the parties to the suit fought with knives.
Historically, the position of the majority is of doubtful validity. The
basis of the majority rule is the case of Matthew v. Ollerton, Cumberbach
218 (20 Reprint 438) 1693. At the time this case was decided the state
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was interested in the action as a means of enforcing penalties for breaches
of the peace. This quasi-criminal feature of the action was abolished by
the Statute of 5 and 6 William and Mary c. 12 (1694)
The next English
case, Boulter v. Clark, Bullers Nisi prius p. 16, 1747, cited Matthew v.
Ollerton, supra. The first American case is Stout v. Wren, 1 (N. Car.)
Hawks 420 (1821) which cited as authority the two prior English cases.
The cases in support of the majority rule cite as authority for their position the three cases last mentioned. Obviously if the dicta in Matthew v.
Ollerton, supra, applies to criminal actions it states the universal rule. See
16 C. J. 92 Sec. 60 n. 78. Dicta in later English cases support the minority
rule. Hegarty v. Shine, 4 Ir. 288 (1878) Slattery v. Haley, 3 Dom. L. R.
156 (1923).
It is a general principle of law that there is no violation of a right
protecting an interest if consent is given to the invasion and further that
no man shall profit by his own wrong doing. Wallace v. Cannon, 38 Ga. 199
(1868) Gilmore v. Fuller 198 Ill. 130, 65 N. E. 84 (1902). See also 24 Cot.
LAw REV. 819. The majority rule is an exception to these two fundamental
principles of law
In the principle case the majority opinion limited the decision to the
facts of the case before it, but the minority did not do so. The principle
case may be distinguished from both the majority and minority cases upon
the ground that combat was not entered into in anger. But it is suggested
that regardless of the limit so put upon the effect of the decision the case
necessarily supports the minority view The distinguishing or qualifying
feature of cases of assault and battery is the consent given by each party
If the act was not illegal, then clearly the rule would be that there could
be no recovery. The illegal act should therefore "either destroy or not
destroy" the consent. Whether the combat is a prize fight or a duel with
deadly weapons entered into with or without anger, it is in any event
illegal. It seems, therefore, that the rule to be laid down is broader than that
stated by the majority opinion in the principal case and is that consent
is a good defense in a civil action for injuries resulting from an illegal
combat. For an analysis of the whole problem with citation of authorities see Am. Institute Treatise No. 1(a), supporting Restatement No. 1
Torts Chapt. V Sec. 7' beginning at page 172 (1925).
R. D. C.
INHERITANcE-ADOPTED CHILD-RIGHT TO INHERIT FROM NATURAL AND
ADOPTIvE PARENT. A child adopted by a stranger was allowed to inherit
from its natural parent, who died testate without mentioning her in his
will, under the pretermission statute, Rem. Comp. Stat., Sec. 1402. The
court stated that an adopted child may inherit from both natural and
adoptive parents under Rem. Comp. Stat., Sec. 1699.
The result of the principal case seems in accord with that reached in
other jurisdictions throughout the country Roberts v. Roberts. 160 Minn.
140, 199 N. W 581 (1924) Wagner v. Varner 50 Iowa 532 (1879)
Head
v. Leak, 61 Ind. App. 253, 111 N. E. 952 (1916) Sorenson v. Churchill, 51
S. D. 113, 212 N. W 488 (1927) In re Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich. 615, 164
N. W 381, L. R. A. 1918A 818 (1917)
In re Lander's Estate, 100 Misc.
Rep. 635, 166 N. Y. S. 1036 (1917)
Sledge v. Floyd, 139 Miss. 398, 104 So.
163 (1925). Contra, Boosey v. Darling, 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916)
Many of the cited cases, although reaching the same result, may be distinguished, either on the basis of statute or facts of the case presented.
The Washington statute, Rem. Comp. Stat., Sec. 1699, declares that the
natural parents shall be divested of all legal rights and obligations in
respect to the child, and the child shall be relieved of all legal obligations
to them, and shall be the legal heir of his adopter, owing the same obligations and having the same rights and duties as a child of the adopter
born in lawful wedlock. Further it provides "that on the decease of
parents who have adopted a child
under this chapter, and the subsequent decease of such child
without issue, the property of such adopting parents shall descend to their next of kin, and not to the next of kin
of such adopted child." The proviso would imply that the legislature
intended to substitute the adoptive parents for the natural parents in
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every legal sense. A number of states reaching a result in accord with
the principal case have no such provision in their statutes of adoption.
Iowa, Laws of 1879, 2308, 2310; South Dakota, Revised Code 1919, 208-10;
Mississippi, Laws of 1917, Sec. 290. In others, the statute expressly
provides that adopted children do not lose the right of inheritance from
their natilral parents, which raises the inference that without such a provision the child would be deprived of such a right of inheritance. Massachusetts, Public Statutes, Chapter 213, No. 7, 1876; New York, Laws of
1916, Chapter 453.
Washington, under its adoption statute, reaches the conclusion that the
adopted child takes both from and through its adoptive parents. In re
In re Hobb's
Masterson's Estate, 108 Wash. 307, 183 Pac. 93 (1919)
Estate, 134 Wash. 424, 235 Pac. 974 (1925). A number of states, without
such a proviso as in the Washington Statute have decided that an adopted
child takes only from, and not through, its adoptive parents, leaving
much more room for the conclusion that the adopted child does not lose
the right of inheritance from its natural parents. Wallace v. Noland, 246
Ill. 535, 92 N. E. 956, 138 Am. St. Rep. 247 (1910) Ryan v. Foreman, 181
Ill. App. 262 (1913), affirmed 262 Ill. 175, 104 N. E. 189; Boaz v. Swinney,
Merritt v. Morton, 143 Ky. 133, 136
79 Kansas 332, 99 Pac. 621 (1909)
S. W 133, 33 L. R. A. (ns) 117, 118 A. S. R. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775 (1911).
California, even without a proviso as in the Washington statute, reaches
the same conclusion as this jurisdiction, but the court states that the
result of such a decision is to substitute the adopting parent for the parent
we must give to that
by blood, and "once we reach (this conclusion)
conclusion its logical result." In re Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938
(1912). The logical result mentioned appears when they deny the right
of an adopted child to inherit from its natural parents, although they
qualify this somewhat by allowing him to inherit from his natural grandparents. Boosey 'v. Darling, supra. The Washington court holds in the
principal case that this conclusion has not been reached by them, since
the adoption statute is in derogation of common law, and must be strictly
construed. It would seem, by strong implication from the proviso in the
statute that such a conclusion should be reached, substitution recognized,
and therefore no claim by the adopted child upon the natural parents.
If this conclusion be reached, the pretermission statute should not
apply, the object of such a statute being to guard against the thoughtlessness of the testator in failing to provide for an heir for whom he is
presumed to have desired to provide. Page on Wills, (2d. Ed.) Vol. 1,
See. 490, N. 791, McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365. 101 N. E. 178
(1913)
Porter v. Porter's Ex'r 120 Ky. 302, 86 S. W 546 (1905)
Meyers v. Watson,
Thomas v. Black, 113 Mo. 286, 20 S. W 657 (1892)
Boman v. Boman, 49 Fed. 329
234 Mo. 286, 136 S. W 236 (1911)
(1892) Bower v. Bower 5 Wash. 225, 31 Pac. 598 (1892) In re Barker's
Estate, 5 Wash. 390, 31 Pac. 976 (1892) Hill v. Hill. 7 Wash. 409, 35 Pac.
360 (1893)
28 R. C. L. 82. Where a child or issue of a child is not
mentioned in the will, or provided for by will or settlement, it is entitled
to take under the statutes relating to the rights of inheritance of pretermitted children, when, and only when, the omission to mention or
provide for the child was unintentional or the result of accident, mistake,
or inadvertence. 18 C. J. 841, Lamar v. Crosby, 162 Ky. 320, Ann.
The presumption is that the omission was the
Cas. 1916E 1033 (1915)
result of accident, mistake, or inadvertence, but Washington will not
allow parol evidence to rebut this presumption, the rebutting proof having to come from the face of the will itself. Bower v. Bower supra. Any
presumption that omission of a child is mistake or inadvertence is gone
where the parent omitting the child has no rights or obligations toward
it. Peerless Pacific Co. v. Burckhard, 90 Wash. 221, 155 Pac. 1037, Ann. Cas.
1918B 247, L. R. A. 1917C 353 (1916).
The cases relied on by the court are not on all fours with the principal
case, which seems to be the only one decided under a pretermission
statute. The court states that there is no statute which prevents such
dual inheritances, quoting Dreyer v. Schrick, 105 Kan. 495, 185 Pac. 30
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(1919) as authority for this proposition. The statute in effect at that
time in Kansas, Gen. Stat. 1915, 6262-6365, has no such provision as
appears in the Washington statute, and the question presented in the
principal case is not presented in Dreyer v. Schrick, supra, the decision
on that point being pure dictum. Under statutes similar to Washington,
a child adopted by its grandparents is allowed to take only as adopted
child, Moran v. Reel, 213 Penn. 81, 62 Atl. 253 (1905) or as grandchild only.
Billings v. Head, 184 Ind. 361, 111 N. E. 176 (1916) amplified in 111 N. E.
952. Under a statute allowing adopted children to take from their natural
parents, a child adopted by his grandfather takes as adopted child only
Delano v. Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619, 20 N. E. 308, 2 L. R. A. 698 (1889)
Contra to these holdings, but under a statute not containing the proviso
of either the Washington or Massachusetts statutes, is In re Bartram's
Estate, 109 Kan. 87, 198 Pac. 192 (1921)
It may be finally argued that the adopted child having no voice in
the matter of his adoption should not be deprived of such benefits as he
might have elected to retain, but this may be answered by the fact that
he is a ward of the equity court, which acts in his best interest. In re
Pillsbury's Estate, 175 Cal. 454, 166 Pac. 11, 3 L. R. A. 1396 (1917). The
result of the principal case seems less desirable under modern conditions
than it would have been at an earlier date. The Washington court, and
others reaching the same decision, seem to have attained it by following
A. G.
previous cases which are not in point.

